This article seeks to explain whether the incidence of armed conflict and the presence of violent non-state actors increase the likelihood of state failure. As failed states are increasingly analysed through the lenses of security dilemma, or security gaps, the incidence of civil war and the involvement of extra-state veto-players became synonymous with the persistence of state failure. Research on failed states posits that armed conflict is conducive to state failure and that many failing, or collapsing states, are engulfed in civil wars. Somalia, South Sudan,
Systematic large-N analyses on the impact of civil wars upon the state failure are notable by their absence.
This study challenges the literature on the linkage between civil war and state failure, and posits that states do not fail or remain failed due to civil violence. Civil conflict is an unfortunate, but not an inseparable attribute of failed states. States fail or remain failed not because of, but despite civil conflict. Bearing in mind the instances of "cold state collapse" along with cases of marginal civil violence, internal violence is not an inseparable attribute of state collapse.
ii The literature on failed state recovery has demonstrated that many states tend to overcome failure irrespectively of ongoing civil violence.
iii A case-study literature has shown that states manage to recover from failure even while armed conflicts are still raging. How does the presence of extra-state actors affect the risk of state failure? The other theoretical assumption proposed in this study is that regardless of the occurrence of civil violence, the presence of VNSAs is potentially conducive to state failure. These non-state agents are not necessarily rebel groups, or terrorist organisations, which (in)directly challenge the state authority, as posited by previous studies, v but various factions pursuing agendas similar to the state while remaining outside of the government's direct control, or lacking legal status. Pro-government militias (PGMs), regional warlords, political factions within the government, but not in opposition to it, civil movements and other pro-government agents might be expected to undermine the state from within without having to challenge it directly.
The presence of VNSAs might be conducive to civil warfare, vi but they also prosper in proposes treating warlords as fundamental stake-holders in failed states. There is no lack of research on militias in failed states. Klare xxxviii argued that "a state's capacity to resist failure can decline rapidly when armed militias emerge or the official security forces break up into semi-autonomous bands." Similarly to the classical arguments on the role of anti-government insurgents, it was posited that "militias tend to compete with one another for control of territory, population, and resources-thereby subjecting the country to recurring bouts of violence and disorder". xxxix There is no agreement, however, as to whether the presence of militias and paramilitaries has a direct effect on state failure. While some scholars argue in favour of the connection between the militia presence and state failure, xl others insist on the opposite. xli As a result, the role of militias and other pro-regime VNSAs in state failure remains critically under-researched.
It is noteworthy that, as in Klare's xlii presentation, militias and other violent non-state agents are understood to function either instead of governments or in direct opposition to the regime. groups (AAG) "completely autonomous and independent of the state and not subject to its authority whatsoever." Since AAGs exist in opposition to governments, their emergence and presence is synonymous with civil violence. Civil war is employed by non-state armed groups as a tool of weakening the state and crippling its authority.
The major problem with the literature on failed states, civil war and VNSAs is that little attention is given to the role of alternative explanations and the probability that neither the incidence of civil violence, nor the perception of VNSAs as AAGs, offer an exhaustive explanation of state failure. Along with the perception of VNSAs as a symptom of failure, the rise of armed group is often portrayed simply as a sign of failing states. Although it has been empirically observed that the majority of civil war-affected states do not fail and that not all failed states are hosting civil conflicts, few efforts were made to systematically examine these counterarguments to the classical theory of state failure. Far less attention has been paid towards the understanding of VNSAs as a diverse group consisting of both anti-government and pro-regime components.
In order to ease the above detailed lack of definitional clarity, this study proposes defining 
Data and variables
The conflict is "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths". lxxi Since the CSP does not control for civil conflict -but instead measures security vulnerability employing a broader term "armed conflict" -the possibility of endogeneity between civil war (IV) and "extreme fragility" (DV) is reduced. A set of control variables is employed to account for levels of democracy, population size, GDP, oil production, and the terrain. Studies on failed states suggest that countries with lower level of democratic governance are more prone to fragility than consolidated democracies.
lxxix
To control for that assumption, I add a democracy dummy that draws on the Polity dataset and distinguishes between democracies (score 6 and above) and non-democracies (-6 or below). A log of population size is based on the World Bank data and is introduced to control for the proposition that populous countries are prone to state failure. lxxx Since much of the literature on failed states converges on the argument that low level of economic production is one of the key indicators of state failure, I introduce a log of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita measured in thousands of constant 1996 U.S. dollars from the World Bank database.
The impact of natural resources has often been cited as closely associated with state failure. In
Clapham's lxxxi words: "Africa's principal oil-exporting countries has proved almost without exception to be dismal." In order to take into consideration the weight of natural resources, a measure of oil production was included from Ross. lxxxii The effect of terrain on state failure has been discussed in the literature only circumstantially. The rough terrain was presented as a challenge for the distribution of goods and services and effective regional development. The findings related to controls produce a number of statistically significant findings.
Democracy and the real GDP per capita consistently remain in negative direction, as expected in other studies on failed states. Population size is positive and significant. Oil production is irrelevant across all models. Rough terrain is important in models without civil war factors, but becomes insignificant with the inclusion of civil violence. The presence of large Muslim population has significant effect in all models.
To expand the analysis, a variable controlling for peace years, along with three cubic splines, was introduced. As shown in Table 1 , peace years produce negative results, suggesting that the number of peace years has poor relationship with state failure. Amongst three cubic splines for specific thresholds in peace periods, only cases with short peace spells in Model 4
with PGM presence produce noteworthy results.
<Figure 1>
To visualise the interpretation of these findings, I estimate the probabilities of association between civil wars, VNSAs and state failure (Figure 1 ). These results confirm the theoretical assumption on weak association between civil war violence and state failure and much stronger markedly vertical relationship between the presence of VNSAs and state failure.
Conclusion
This article examined the impact of civil war violence and the presence of VNSAs on the phenomenon of state failure. Challenging the well-established in literature on failed states linkage between armed conflict and state failure, this study argued that the existence of armed pro-regime veto-players has higher effect on state failure than the incidence of civil violence.
Statistical tests revealed that while the vast majority of failed states are affected by armed conflicts, less than half of fragile or failing states host ongoing civil conflicts. These findings suggest that although failed states are highly susceptible to armed conflict, the state failure does not occur exclusively, or predominantly due to armed violence. The quantitative analysis shows that a high percentage of failing states reach the threshold of failure without succumbing to civil war. Following the state failure and the state's loss of capacity to provide human security, the chances of a state to become engulfed by civil violence dramatically increase.
The presence of VNSAs in fragile states -even in countries unaffected by violenceemerges as particularly conducive to state failure. In its analysis of VNSAs, this study has aimed to shift the focus from rebel groups and other anti-regime actors towards those elements of non-state forces, which either support the regime or remain neutral. It was argued that pro- This study contributes to research on failed states by emphasising the role of alternative explanations of state failure. The shift from the armed conflict paradigm -prioritised in numerous studies on failed states -towards closer and more nuanced analysis of the actors of failure opens new prospects for research on failed states and improves our understanding of the VNSAs' role in state destabilisation processes. The focus on the diversity of armed actors particularly in states on the verge of collapse offers prospects for conflict prevention, statebuilding and peace-making. It also casts a fresh glance on the relationship between a fragile nation-state and extra-state actors, which in many failing states tends to evolve towards higher levels of symmetry and even towards the transformation of roles and functions.
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